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Bluestein v. Bluestein, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 14 (Mar. 26, 2015)1
FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY
Summary
The Court held a district court has the authority to review and modify a custodial
agreement once either party makes a modification request. When modifying a custodial
agreement, however, the district court must primarily look for the child’s best interest.
Background
Ellen and Michael Bluestein were married for 13 years, had one child together, and
divorced in 2004. In their stipulated divorce decree, Michael would have the child from 5 p.m.
on Thursday to 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, Ellen would have the child for the remainder of the time,
and the parties would alternate holidays. The stipulation did not cover child support or explicitly
stated if there was primary or joint physical custody.
In 2011, Michael began receiving public assistance and the Nevada Department of Health
and Human Services sought a reimbursement from Ellen for a portion of Michael’s state aid as
her child support obligation. Ellen objected and requested that the court designate her as the
child’s primary physical custodian. Ellen argued that under the custodial agreement Michael only
had the child 38 percent of the time instead of the 40 percent in accordance with Rivero.2 Under
Rivero, parents have joint custody when they have the child 40 percent of the time per week.
The district court entered an order concluding that Ellen had primary physical custody of
the child because Michael only had the child 38.393 percent of the time. Michael motioned for
reconsideration, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing dealt
with the responsibilities of both parties regarding the child on Thursdays. The court designated
Ellen as the child’s primary physical custodian because Ellen had the child over 60 percent of the
time. The court did not state whether it took into account the child’s best interest. Michael
appealed and challenged the designation of Ellen as the child’s primary physical custodian.
Discussion
Modifying custody agreements
Public policy encourages parents to enter into private custody agreements for coparenting.3 These agreements are generally enforceable until one or both of the parties move the
court to modify the custody agreement. However, once the parties move the court to modify an
existing custody agreement, the court must use Nevada law. Michael argues that since Ellen did
not request a change in the timeshare, then the district court lacked authority to modify the
custody agreement.

1

By Ashleigh Wise.
Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 216 P.3d 213 (2009).
3
St. Mary v. Damon, 129 Nev. ___,___, 309 P.3d 1027, 1035–36 (2013); Rennels v. Rennels,
127 Nev. ___,___, 257 P.3d 396, 399 (2011).
2

1

The parties’ agreement to share joint physical custody controlled until Ellen asked the
court to designate her as the primary physical custodian. Ellen did not request a modification to
the timeshare, but she did request a modification to the physical custodial agreement. The district
court has the authority to review timeshare arrangements and determine whether the parties
shared joint physical custody under Nevada law. Since the district court has proper authority, it
could modify the agreement accordingly.
Child’s best interest is paramount when modifying custody
Whenever an issue of custody modification is brought before the court, the court must
consider whether such modification is in the child’s best interest.4 Here the district court used the
40 percent test in Rivero instead of considering the child’s best interest. In Rivero, the parties
agreed to joint physical custody but created a timeshare agreement where the mother had the
child for five days each week. The parties filed motions to either modify the timeshare agreement
or the physical custody. The district court determined that the parties intended a joint physical
custody arrangement and ordered a modification to the timeshare.
On appeal, the Supreme Court set parameters for the purpose of clarifying which
timeshare arrangements qualified as joint physical custody. The Court held it is in the child’s
best interest to have frequent associations and a continuing relationship with each parent and to
encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. 5 The child’s best
interest is paramount in custody matters. Further, there is a presumption that joint physical
custody is in the best interests of a child. The 40-percent custody threshold serves as a baseline to
achieve these aims.
Here, The Court held that the district court looked solely to the 40-percent guideline in
modifying the custody agreement and did not consider the child’s best interest. Further, the Court
held the 40-percent guideline in Rivero should not be so rigidly applied that it would preclude
joint physical custody when the court has broad discretion in using the child’s best interest for
custodial designations. Moreover, the child’s best interest is especially important when one
parent has the child for almost 40 percent of the time and the timeshare allows the child to have
frequent associations with each parent. Finally, the Court held it is important to look for the
child’s best interest when one parent requests a modification solely to decrease child support
obligation.
Conclusion
The district court abused its discretion by not looking towards the child’s best interest
when modifying the parties’ custodial agreement to designate Ellen as primary physical
custodian. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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